♥ Share this episode with someone you think will benefit from it. ♥
♥ Leave a review at Lovethepodcast.com/BusinessConfidential ♥
Photo Credit: @istockphoto.com/mmac72
Initial public offerings (IPOs) tapping capital markets on Wall Street sounds glamorous and are a terrific way to fuel business expansion plans. But too many small and mid-cap companies find themselves at a serious disadvantage after they’ve gone public.
Adam J. Epstein believes many of those IPOs facing challenges are rooted in some very common pre-IPO mistakes.
Discover what they are and how to be better prepared for them.
What You’ll Discover About IPOs :
- How pre-IPO mistakes plague IPOs and their financing options
- Why historic deal data matters to IPOs
- The most common mistake companies make when picking an investment banker and how it affects IPOs
- How mutual funds run circles around small and mid-cap companies and what you can do about it
- PLUS so much more
Guest: Adam J. Epstein
Adam J. Epstein is a nationally recognized small-cap expert and advisor to the boards of pre-IPO and small-cap companies through his firm, Third Creek Advisors, LLC (TCA).
Prior to TCA, Adam was a long-tenured institutional investor, an experience which gives him a comparative perspective on why some small and mid-cap companies are more successful in their post-IPO financing efforts than others.
He speaks monthly at corporate governance and investor conferences, and is a distinguished National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) Board Leadership Fellow and faculty member.
Adam is also the small-cap contributing editor for Directorship magazine, the boardroom intelligence publication of the National Association of Corporate Directors, as well as the author of the best-selling book The Perfect Corporate Board: A Handbook for Mastering the Unique Challenges of Small-Cap Companies.
Related Resources:
If you liked this interview, you might also enjoy our other Finance episodes.
Contact Adam and connect with him on LinkedIn and Twitter.
Learn more about Third Creek Advisors, LLC
Learn more about the National Association of Corporate Directors
_____
What All Aspiring IPOs Need to Know to Conquer Capital Markets with Adam J. Epstein
Some entrepreneurs believe that tapping capital markets on Wall Street by going public with an initial public offering, that magic IPO, puts their business expansion and financing needs on easy street. Yet, some are finding out that the actual experience is not as easy as they thought.
And today’s guest says that many of those post-IPO challenges in the capital markets are rooted in pre-IPO mistakes. We’ll learn more about that and how you can set your business up for more success when we come back.
This is Business Confidential Now with Hanna Hasl-Kelchner, helping you see business issues hiding in plain view that matter to your bottom line.
Welcome to Business Confidential Now, the weekly podcast for smart executives, managers, and entrepreneurs looking to improve business performance and their bottom line.
I’m your host, Hanna Hasl-Kelchner, and today’s amazing guest is Adam J. Epstein. Adam is a firm believer that many post-IPO financing challenges really began in some very common pre-IPO mistakes, and I’m curious to know what they are.
Because if you’re not a public company yet, but you want to be, now is the time to avoid those pitfalls. And even if you are public already, tracing those root causes help you identify opportunities for fixes.
But before we get started, I’d like to tell you a little bit about Adam, his remarkable career, and why he’s eminently qualified to talk about today’s topic. Adam is a nationally recognized small-cap expert and advisor to boards of pre-IPO and small-cap companies through his firm, Third Creek Advisors, LLC.
Now, prior to founding Third Creek Advisors, he was a long tenured institutional investor, and during that time, he discovered why some small- and mid-cap companies are more successful, post-IPO, than others.
He speaks monthly at Corporate Governance and Investor Conferences, is a distinguished National Association of Corporate Directors, board leadership fellow, and a contributor to Directorship magazine, and an author of the best-selling book, The Perfect Corporate Board: A Handbook for Mastering the Unique Challenges of Small-Cap Companies.
I’ve been reading his book, and I love the practical tips that he sprinkled throughout the pages. It’s a real treat to have him here. Welcome to Business Confidential Now, Adam.
Thanks for having me, Hanna.
It’s a pleasure. It’s my pleasure. Believe me, I’m fascinated by your book, The Perfect Corporate Board. Tell me, what inspired you to write it?
Yes. As you referenced in the intro, Hanna, I co-manage a special situation hedge fund in San Francisco for many years, that invested in more than 500 small-cap financings. It was a lot of work over the course of many years. I literally met with hundreds of companies, and had probably a dozen plus notebooks full of repetitive observations about small-cap management teams and governance practices and the challenges that these companies routinely faced.
One of the principal takeaways, I’d say, from my lengthy institutional investing tenure, and also my subsequent experience governing and advising small-cap boards is that no matter what anyone tells you to the contrary, and notwithstanding, by the way, in my opinion anyway, how many in the corporate governance community in the United States have dangerously coalesced to this notion, a one-size-fits-all approach to corporate governance doesn’t work. It just doesn’t work, and I don’t know how to say it any other way, frankly.
But governing Apple or governing Chevron is just not the same thing at all as governing a $150 Million biotech company, for example, full stop. And though it might seem self-evident, and to those who always nod their heads when I say that all around the country at speaking engagements, that’s the way that most corporate governance has been historically taught and conceived in this country, which is governance is governance.
If you govern a large company, it’s the same thing as governing a small company, and it’s not true at all. And succinctly, my experience has been that this kind of ubiquitous reliance on the notion of one-size-fits-all corporate governance has hurt generations of shareholders in small public companies.
And my cajoling, if you will, the governance world, over the last five years since retiring from investing, has been an attempt to level the proverbial playing field in that regard and provide a framework for small-cap directors to analyze the unique challenges they face.
Since the corporate governance community historically, frankly, has overlooked the distinction, and many of the unique challenges that small-cap directors face over and over again, as you and I have discussed, Hanna, fit within the categories of capital markets and corporate finance, which is our conversation today.
And I just saw so many small-cap management teams and boards struggle with those unique issues over and over and over again, and I figured out, after concluding my investing career, that amazingly, there was nowhere for these C-suites and directors to go to get objective answers to their unique questions.
And that was really the goal of writing the book. I’m certainly humbled that it’s been ranked in the top ten of a number of categories over the last couple of years on Amazon, and fortunately, as a result of writing the book and speaking about it around the country, lots of constructive dialog is created, which is a good thing.
There are now many more resources available than previously for officers and directors of small public companies. For example, you reference NECD puts on some terrific continuing education programs for small-cap directors now that that never existed. The leading governance magazine in the United States, which is Directorship magazine, now has small-cap specific content, which of course it never did.
And NASDAQ has a groundbreaking new content initiative called Amplify that’s available exclusively to NASDAQ issuers, and is focused on the unique challenges faced by micro and small-cap companies, and I’m proud that they’ve asked me to be an ongoing contributor to Amplify.
So, I guess I’d probably summarize by saying that there have been a lot of great strides made, but there’s a lot more left to accomplish, Hanna.
That’s wonderful. And I’m so glad that you’ve put the conversation on the agenda for people, so they’re starting to pay attention to it. As mentioned during our introduction, you’re a strong believer that so many of the challenges companies face in their post-IPO financing is rooted in pre-IPO mistakes. Can you help me understand how that happens? What’s the connection?
It’s a great question, Hanna, and it’s too bad that this conversation doesn’t take place more regularly in pre-IPO boardrooms. Particularly, venture-backed IPO Candidates are often fixated with hiring Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs, and J.P. Morgan. There’s certainly nothing wrong with those banks. Of course, they are global leaders for a reason. But here’s the thing, the lion’s share of pre-IPO companies miss, and they miss it because there’s typically limited capital market experience either on these boards or in C-suites.
While we hear all the time about the Twitters and the Facebooks, the reality is, is that the median market cap of venture-backed IPO candidates after their IPO is actually only $450 million or so, which means the typical post-IPO company actually hovers on the fence between being a micro and a small-cap company.
So, again, while it’s terrific to have the name recognition of the bulge bracket banks in your corner for an IPO, here’s the capital markets reality. The way your stock gets “sold” to investors after an IPO, is that institutional sales people that work together with research analysts, they call their clients, and those clients are institutional investors, whether they manage mutual funds or hedge funds. And they try and interest them in buying the stock in conjunction with their research recommendations.
In other words, they call a company and say, “We’re calling about company ABC. We have a buy recommendation on it. Here are the three reasons why we think you should own the stock.”
But here’s the problem. If you look at all the companies under coverage at bulge bracket banks, the median market cap of those companies is in the many billions of dollars.
In other words, their “clients,” these institutional investors are interested in buying stocks of large companies. And when the bulge bracket banks cover your little company, there are very, very, very few clients for them to call to interest in your stock, because very, very, very few institutional clients of bulge bracket banks, i.e., mutual fund managers and hedge fund managers ever buy stocks in little companies.
So, that’s why you need to make sure that if you’re going to include the likes of Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, et cetera on your IPO cover, that you also make room for some much smaller banks. Why? Because the median market cap of their research universe looks much more like your little company, and they in turn, actually have clients to call to sell your stock to you.
So again, Hanna, the main culprit here is a lack of capital markets expertise, true capital markets expertise in the C-suites and the boards. And just to be clear about what happens when companies get this wrong, which unfortunately they routinely do, is that your company is going to join the enormous ranks of what investors euphemistically call orphaned IPO companies.
These companies end up with depressed stock prices, low trading volume, little institutional ownership, and very high cost of capital. So, the takeaway here is pretty simple. If you’re hiring an investment bank because of the research coverage for your IPO that’s likely going to ensue, make sure that the median market cap of their coverage universe matches up with your company.
Interesting. Classic supply and demand, right? Make sure there’s a good match.
Yes, absolutely.
Okay, great. Yes. Well, we remember from the financial crisis, how much emphasis was placed on the fact that Lehman Brothers, for example, had no derivatives experts on their board, yet derivatives were a central enterprise risk for them.
Is board composition at the root of post-IPO financing, challenges for small- and mid-cap companies?
Well, the short answer is yes, [Laughter] just to set the perspectives, Hanna. Something like 80%. The real number is 76% or 77%, but for our purposes today, 80% of U.S. public companies actually have market caps below $500 million. And just to be clear with all the listeners what market cap means, market cap is multiplying the issued and outstanding shares by the trading price of the stock.
And just for comparison purposes, General Electric has a market cap of approximately 275 billion, with a B. Yet, the average market cap of 80% of the public companies in the United States is below 500 million, with an M. So, put differently, the overwhelming majority of public companies are small.
Despite what we see and hear in the newspapers and on television that are, of course, fixated exclusively on large public companies. What do we know about these smaller public companies? Well, among other things, many of the 80% of companies that have market caps below $500 billion just aren’t sufficiently cashflow-positive to finance their growth.
So, they require outside capital, sometimes multiple times to get to sustainability, and if you’re a life science company, sometimes multiple times within the same year. Small-cap companies raise an average of between $35-50 billion in growth capital annually. Interestingly, that’s a marketplace that some years, is larger than the IPO market, even though you never you never hear about it.
And just to be extra clear, the fundraising activity in this market segment is predominantly not optional, it’s mandatory. These companies are going to run out of money if they don’t go out and raise more equity capital.
So, here’s the interesting rub, and it’s something I noticed repeatedly when I was an institutional investor, and certainly in my subsequent experience advising lots of small-cap boards, and that is the following: serial need for growth capital notwithstanding, the overwhelming majority of small-cap boards don’t contain corporate finance experts.
I mean, think about what that means. And I’m certainly happy to speak offline with some of your listeners about why I think this is the case. I can’t overstate this or say it any more clearly, that in the thousand-plus companies that came to us when I was an institutional investor, and just to be resolutely clear, 100% of those companies require capital. That’s why they were coming to us.
Well less than 10% of those companies had any capital markets or corporate finance experts on their boards. And when you think about that, another institutional investing friend of mine used to say, this would be like starting a company to design a new space shuttle and not having any in-house engineers. Right?
I mean, that’s what we’re really talking about. And for anybody who doubts that this dynamic exists, rest assured that there is not a single small-cap special situation hedge fund, which is what I did for many years in this country, that doesn’t systematically exploit this disconnect, and very profitably so on a daily basis.
This is a movie that doesn’t end well for shareholders, the vast majority of the time. Unfortunately, it happens every business day, as sure as day follows night.
What’s happening is that the vast majority of public companies – again, we’re talking about 80% of the public companies in the United States – are routinely either outsourcing, at best, or I would argue, almost abdicating at worst, critical, must have financing decisions to third parties, because they don’t have capital markets and corporate finance experts on their boards. What do you know about these third parties?
Well, these third parties are investment banks, and investment banks are absolutely critical to the capital markets ecosystem, and there are some terrific investment banks and bankers in the small-cap space. But there’s a manifest conflict of interest with investment banks, and that is investment banks only get paid if a company does their deal.
So, the reality is, again, there’s a systemic outsourcing or abdicating of must-have financing decisions to third parties that have a manifest conflict of interest. And it has to change. My takeaway, Hanna, is that I will continue to talk about it and write about it until it does. [Laughter]
Well, I think you’re going to be having a lot to write about for a long time, because who knew they were abdicating to people who have a conflict of interest? They may not realize they have such a blatant conflict of interest. I mean, it’s really fascinating. Really, who knew?
Yes, I think you’re right.
You spent quite a bit of time in your book, discussing something that most of our listeners – and besides what you just mentioned, probably haven’t thought about. And that’s the failure of most C-suites and boards to utilize historic deal data to optimize their financing results. Could you explain what you mean by historic deal data and why they’re so important?
Yes. Particularly as it pertains to financing every officer and director of small public company that regularly needs external growth capital, really needs to be a student of history, Hanna. Why? Because financings don’t happen in a vacuum.
The financing terms that a small public company is most likely to garner are likely quite similar to financing terms recently offered to a substantially similar peer company. And when I say substantially similar, I’m referring to the industry they’re in, the market cap, the trading volume, et cetera..
So, first, what is historic deal data information about the amount of money raised by a public company and all the specific terms of that financing, all of that is public record from SEC filings. There are various different vendors out there that have aggregated those data and put them in searchable format, and interestingly, these data are religiously parsed by investment bankers and investors.
Yet, interestingly, and after investing in more than 500 small-cap financings as an institutional investor and advising dozens of boards, I can tell you that I’ve literally never come across a single company that analyzes these historic deal data, which, by the way, is available to anybody for a small annual fee.
So, I refer to this historic deal data are the elephant in the room, if you will, for small public companies that regularly need capital, because those data enable anybody to know exactly what terms similarly situated companies are garnering out there in the marketplace.
And without those data – I mean, the takeaways are that without those data, you’re either guessing at the terms that your company is likely to get, or you’re relying on the word of somebody else, and companies needn’t, and by the way, shouldn’t, be doing either of those things.
That’s a scary thing, especially since so much of the business future is hinging on that. You mentioned that this historic deal data is available to anyone for a small annual fee. If I was looking for that kind of data, where would I go to find that?
Yes, you can go – there’s one company called Private Rates, that’s probably one of the most substantial ones. They have data, again, for almost every one of those financings, and that was done in the $30-50 billion worth over the last year.
You can go and search by company. You can go and search by all the different types of deal structures, etc.. It’s all it’s all there laid out in a really user friendly format. In my book, I mentioned there’s a number of others as well.
Terrific. That’s really valuable. Now, anyone who’s heard you speak around the country knows that you feel like most small and mid-cap companies lack the right processes to choose an investment bank that’s best for them. Even in your prior discussion here with us, you mentioned that about the big marquee names.
Now, what are some of the common mistakes that companies make in choosing an investment bank and why does it matter?
Well, I think, unfortunately, we don’t have nearly enough time to talk about the continuum of horrific mistakes that small public companies make in selecting investment banks, but I’ll touch on a few of them.
First and foremost, the decision to hire an investment bank should always be quantitative, not qualitative. The decision to hire an investment bank should always be quantitative, not qualitative. And unfortunately, it rarely is.
And by the way, bankers make it hard on companies to be quantitative, because amazingly, Hanna, I’ve never seen an investment banking PowerPoint presentation that doesn’t show that an investment bank is somehow number one at something. I don’t know where number two and three and four are, [Laughter] but investment banks are always number one at something. I’ve never figured out how everyone could be number one.
But in any event, I think if you’re going to ask one seminal question about which bank is best for your company, it should be the following: what investment bank has the most recent, relevant, successful experience in raising money for a company that looks and feels like your company?
More specifically, which bank has recently raised the amount of money that your company is looking for using the structure that you believe is most likely, and that is going to come from historic deal data, by the way.
Going back to our prior comments. For a company that looks and feels like your company, that’s the starting point, Hanna. That question, again, relying on historic deal data, will usually depict a handful of investment banks and thereafter you need to analyze the recent similar financings for companies like yours and see which one of those banks seems to be able to raise money on the least dilutive terms.
There’s always going to be one or two that seem to garner less dilutive terms for their clients, the companies, then their competitors. And that’s where companies should start.
Are there good reasons to deviate from the methodology? There’s not too many good reasons. There’s a few times that it’s probably okay to deviate from that methodology. Number one, sometimes there are companies that are pretty keen on getting research coverage from a particular analyst because they hold a lot of sway within an industry. That certainly could be a worthwhile reason to deviate from the methodology.
Again, hearkening back to the earlier conversation, you need to make sure that the median market cap of companies under coverage by that analyst look and feel like your company. Another reason why you may deviate from the methodology, sometimes the targeted investment bank may not have a lot of interest in working with you or your company, or they might be too busy, in which case you have no choice but to pursue another bank.
And last, I’d say sometimes the bank itself might be keen on a relationship, but the particular banker at that firm that has all the experience isn’t available, and you and I, Hanna, know from our experience in the law business, that just like law firms, investment banks are only as good as the person who’s working on your account.
So, unfortunately, I’d say that the quantitative approach is hardly ever used. Companies instead default to any banker that’s either shown interest in them. Maybe the bank that appears to be the biggest or have the best or splashiest investor conferences, or the banker that the company has always used. And look, you might get a great banker using that methodology, but you probably won’t, in my experience.
So, I think to recap, Hanna, the choice of what banker to use, ultimately, has to be data driven. The data, not the investment bankers’ PowerPoint slides, by the way. But historic deal data show the best bank for your company is the bank that has recent relevant experience undertaking capital raises for companies just like yours and has displayed the ability to garner the least dilutive terms. That’s the right bank for your company.
Perfect. It’s not just about following the money, it’s about following the smart money to help you with your financing. I love it, I love it. And actually, for any listener who’s just joined in and Adam is talking about a book, his book, if you’re just tuning in, its called The Perfect Corporate Board A Handbook for Mastering the Unique Challenges of Small cap Companies. That’s what we’re talking about here.
And actually, one of the most fascinating sections of your book is the importance of trading volume to small- and mid-cap financing results. I just love the one chapter you call volume, Volume, Volume. It reminds me of realtors saying location, location, location. It’s so important. Can you help us understand why it’s so important, and common misunderstandings about trading volumes?
Sure. I agree. And if location, location, location is everything for retail, which it is, then volume, volume, volume is definitely everything for smaller public companies, particularly those that require regular access to the equity capital markets.
Trading volume does a lot of things for smaller public companies that larger public companies take for granted. Trading volume makes financings less dilutive and makes them possible, frankly. It makes institutional sponsorship possible, meaning, the ability for institutional investors to own your stock and also to get sell side research coverage.
Trading volume enables use of stock for M&A situations. In other words, if you’re trying to use your stock to buy another company, no other company is going to want your stock if it never trades, because they’re never going to be able to monetize the stock. And trading volume enables employees and all the officers and directors to monetize stock options.
So a lot of people forget unless they get into a situation with a smaller public company, that if your stock doesn’t trade, then all the stock options that you have aren’t worth terribly much if you can never sell them. And so, trading volume is really I think the best way to look at it as a trading volume is tantamount to alternatives for the vast majority of smaller public companies, since many of them, as we talked about earlier, serially require access to the equity capital markets.
Again, just to handicap the size of what we’re talking about, it’s a $30-50 billion marketplace, in some years, again, even larger than the IPO market. So, this is a large number of companies that we’re talking about. And for those companies, volume is really tantamount to alternatives for those companies.
Trading volume is so important that I’ve actually argued in a number of speaking engagements and investor conferences and corporate governance events, that trading volume is so important to a lot of small public companies that it should really be viewed by a lot of these companies as an enterprise risk, frankly, along the lines of things like cybersecurity.
Why? Well, if you require access to the equity capital markets and you have no trading volume, you might very well run out of money. And so, that certainly qualifies as an enterprise risk. The biggest misunderstanding, I think, about trading volume, and I run into this all the time with boards that I advise, and certainly when I was an institutional investor, is where trading volume comes from.
And actually, this is something that until I wrote the book and began speaking about it, it’s amazing that it just doesn’t get discussed very often. Notwithstanding that we’re talking about something that the lion’s share of public companies face.
Trading volume comes from retail investors, in other words, nonprofessional investors. Mary and Johnny and Naperville, Illinois, that are buying stock for maybe their son’s or daughter’s college fund. That’s where trading volume comes from, and that supplies, at some point, sufficient enough volume to enable institutional investors to trade the stock. It’s not the other way around.
One of the things that very few people understand is the math that’s associated with it. Small public companies waste an unbelievable amount of time and money annually running around trying to interest institutional investors to buy their stock when they are literally mathematically foreclosed from purchasing it.
In my experience, less than one out of ten small public companies, CEOs or board members, understand the math. So, I’m just going to give you a really simple example, because this is something, again, that’s so poorly understood out there, and results in so much money and time being wasted.
If you think about a typical hedge fund that maybe needs to invest $1,000,000.00 in a company, and the reason why they would have a minimum position size is because if you’re a certain size fund, if you invest a too tiny increment of money, even if the stock goes up by ten X, it’s not going to move the needle for your fund.
So, say a particular hedge fund needs to invest $1,000,000.00 in a given position. If you have a company whose stock trades about $50,000.00 a day, not shares, but dollars. So, if you take the amount of shares that are traded every day and you multiply that by your stock price, that’s how many dollars of your stock are traded every day.
Say you have a stock that trades $50,000.00 a day, institutional investors don’t ever want to accumulate any more than about 10% of a given small public company stock on a given day, because if they do that, they’re going to push the stock price up. If you do the math very easily, an investor in this company could only accumulate about $5,000.00 of that company’s stock a day or 10% of $50,000.00.
And since a fund will rarely take more than about 10 or 15 days to accumulate their position, they would only be able to purchase about $75,000.00 of this company’s stock, whereas they really need to own $1,000,000.00. So, they’re not even close. And so, in other words, they’re not even going to try.
So, just to sum up, Hanna, trading volume is absolutely critical for smaller public companies that need regular access to the equity capital markets. And it’s the section of the book that I most routinely get thanked for, that’s for sure. It’s something that unfortunately, is just really poorly understood.
Well, I’m glad that you can clarify that. And for listeners who want to find your book and read it so they too can be informed, where can they find it?
Fortunately, it’s available with just a couple of clicks on Amazon.com. That’s where I think the lion’s share of readers get it from. I believe it’s also available from Barnes and Noble as well, online. And there are certainly Barnes and Noble stores where I’ve seen it for sale physically, for those of you like me who actually like going to a bookstore. [Laughter]
Yes, I like browsing through the books myself. Actually, you do something very interesting with the royalties from this book, Adam. Tell us about that.
Yes. I donate my royalties to a charity that, in my opinion, does a terrific job of helping U.S. veterans and their family, called Fisher House Foundation.
There’s almost two dozen U.S. veterans a day that commit suicide in the United States, and none of us can possibly feel good about that or the way that we treat veterans in the United States. So, I felt compelled to donate all the royalties to a charity that at least tries to help. So, I appreciate you asking.
I think it speaks a lot to your generous heart, and our listeners definitely need to know that, because you’ve just given us so much here, and this is another way of giving back. And II really value that. I value you, I value your expertise and advice. I just have one last question in closing. Do you have any parting thoughts or advice for our listeners?
Yes, thanks, Hanna. I’d like to just underscore that if your company is going to need access to the equity capital markets, then put somebody with recent relevant capital markets and corporate finance experience on your board.
And when I say relevant, if you’re a $400 million company, getting somebody who has mostly served on the boards of $200 billion companies is not going to be terribly relevant. So, get someone with recent relevant capital markets and corporate finance experience and put them on your board.
The vast majority of small-cap companies in the United States think that they know how to finance their companies, and I can tell you, Hanna, and I can speak to all of your listeners and say resolutely that from a buy side perspective, that absolutely nothing could be further from the truth.
Hedge funds absolutely run circles around small-cap companies 365 days a year, and it shouldn’t be this way and it needn’t be this way. Small-cap companies are the chief source of jobs and the chief source of innovation in this country, and they’re constantly undertaking needlessly dilutive and poorly conceived financings, and this needs to change.
And I’m going to continue to do my best to help. And to you, Hanna, thanks so much for having me and for facilitating a discussion about these issues that are really important to the U.S. economy.
Thank you, Adam. I appreciate your time and all you do to help entrepreneurs and small-cap businesses be more successful in accessing capital markets.
If you’re listening and you’d like to learn more about Adam J. Epstein, Third Creek Advisors, LLC, or his best-selling book, The Perfect Corporate Board: A Handbook for Mastering the Unique Challenges of Small-Cap Companies. That information, along with a transcript of our conversation, can be found at the episode page over at BusinessConfidentialRadio.com.
Thanks so much for listening. Please be sure to tell your friends about the show, and leave a positive review. We’ll be back next Thursday with another episode of Business Confidential Now. Until then, have a great day, and an even better tomorrow.
Join, Rate and Review:
Rating and reviewing the show helps us grow our audience and allows us to bring you more of the rich information you need to succeed from our high powered guests. Leave a review at Lovethepodcast.com/BusinessConfidential.
Joining the Business Confidential Now family is easy and lets you have instant access to the latest tactics, strategies and tips to make your business more successful.
Follow on your favorite podcast app here as well as on Facebook, YouTube, and LinkedIn.
Download ♥ Follow ♥ Listen ♥ Learn ♥ Share ♥ Review ♥ Comment ♥ Enjoy
Disclosure:
This post may contain links to products to products on Amazon.com with which I have an affiliate relationship. I may receive commissions or bonuses from your actions on such links, AT NO ADDITIONAL COST TO YOU.